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Abstract: Most studies on entrepreneurs’ networks incorporate social capital and 
networks as independent variables that affect entrepreneurs’ actions and its outcomes. By 
contrast, this article examines social capital of the Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists as dependent variables, and it examines entrepreneurs’ social capital 
from the perspectives of institutional theory and cultural theory. The empirical data are 
composed of structured telephone interviews with 159 software entrepreneurs, and the 
data of 124 venture capital decisions in Beijing and Moscow. The study found that social 
networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs are smaller in size, denser in structure, and more 
homogeneous in composition compared to networks of the Russian entrepreneurs due to 
the institutional and cultural differences between the two countries. Furthermore, the 
study revealed that dyadic (two-person) ties are stronger and interpersonal trust is greater 
in China than in Russia. The research and practical implications are discussed. 
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Social capital defined as networks of relationships and assets located in these 
networks (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988) is an important explanatory variable of 
entrepreneurial performance, because it enables entrepreneurs to recognize opportunities, 
access diverse information and resources in a timely manner, reduces transaction and 
monitoring cost, enhances learning and interpersonal trust, and promotes cooperation in 
and among others. Scholars found that alliance networks of young firms affect their 
perceived legitimacy and revenue growth (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2001; Stuart, 
Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Through a network of relationships, entrepreneurs access bank 
loans (Uzzi, 1999), private equity (Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Shane & Cable, 2002), and 
obtain product, marketing, and client-related information (Birley, 1985). In general, 
social networks of entrepreneurs facilitate venture birth and development (Batjargal, 
2003), although under certain conditions it may hinder firm performance by constraining 
entrepreneurial activities (Uzzi, 1997).  
Most studies on entrepreneurial networks incorporate social capital and social 
networks as independent variables that affect entrepreneurs’ actions and its outcomes  
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2001). However, the structural and relational patterns of 
entrepreneurs’ networks as dependent variables are important social phenomena that 
should be explained systematically. A purpose of this article is to explain the differences 
in structures and relational aspects of social networks of entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists by employing the main postulates of institutional theory and cultural theory. 
The main theoretical argument that I am making is that institutions and cultures influence 
network structures and relations in interactive ways. 
Social networks of actors are deeply embedded in local cultures, institutions, and 
traditions (Bhappu, 2000; Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000). However, little research has 
been conducted on this aspect of social capital. In this study, I compare and contrast 
social capital of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in two largest transition economies 
– China and Russia. The second purpose of this study is, therefore, to show how different 
institutions and contrasting cultures in China and Russia influence the structure and 
relational patterns of social networks of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. 
In this study, institutions are defined as “the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North, 1990: 3), and institutional transformation is regarded as   2 
changes in the formal rules, regulations, and constraints that influence actors’ behaviors. 
This definition is consistent with the regulatory pillar of institutions proposed by Scott 
(2001). Thus, I will refer to institutions as formal rules, regulations, and structures for the 
purpose of this study, although I acknowledge that the normative and cognitive aspects of 
institutions are important (Scott, 2001).  
China as a communist country, and Russia as a former communist state, are 
experiencing unprecedented institutional changes. This institutional transformation can 
be characterized as a dual process: On the one hand, it is a deinstitutionalization process 
that is reflected in the erosion or discontinuity of institutionalized organizational 
activities and practices (Oliver, 1992). This is an instutionalization process, on the other 
hand, that is reflected in the emergence of new rules, regulations, and structures that 
constrain and facilitate actors’ activities. 
Although the dual processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization are 
occurring in China and Russia simultaneously, the Chinese transformation may be 
described as a predominantly institutionalization process, whereas the Russian transition 
may be regarded as a predominantly deinstitutionalization process. In China, the 
emergence of brand new rules, regulations and organizations, e.g., capitalist market 
institutions, is happening in parallel with the existence and evolution of the old socialist 
institutions and organizations such as state economic planning, the Communist Party of 
China, or the Young Communist League. In contrast, the formation of democratic 
institutions and capitalist market rules in Russia is occurring after the complete 
destruction of the old communist institutions and organizations such as economic 
planning, the Soviet communist party, or the Soviet secret police. 
The Russian and the Chinese leadership had embraced strikingly different paths of 
economic and institutional reforms in the early 1980s. Russia has chosen the so-called 
“Big-ban” or shock therapy approach, which introduced rapid political and economic 
liberalization, and massive privatization of state enterprises during a short period of time. 
Russia carried out political decentralization that shifted much of political power from the 
center-Moscow to regional and local governments, allowing local elites to “hijack” the 
newly found autonomy (Blanchard & Shleifer, 2001). Furthermore, the Russian central 
government introduced a series of rules and mechanisms that were designed to control   3 
Russia’s regions and provinces fiscally through the new systems of budget and taxation. 
While the Russian political reforms and fiscal federalism policies dismantled the old 
institutions, they did not create effective market institutions. This resulted in the 
institutional void or chaos that plagued the country during the 1990s. 
In contrast, China has adopted the policy framework of gradualism that resulted in the 
staged economic liberalization, sequenced privatization and evolving institutional 
transformation (Bhaumik & Estrin, 2005). The Chinese leadership carried out 
successfully political centralization and fiscal decentralization (Blanchard & Shleifer, 
2001). While the Communist Party of China further consolidated its absolute dominance 
of the political institutions, i.e., the legislature, ministries, local governments, judiciary, 
media, security forces, and military, it effectively transferred power in areas of economy, 
education, and culture to non-party bureaucracies. The end result of the institutional 
transformation in China is the strengthened party control over the government and public 
organizations, and the greater autonomy and fiscal independence of economic institutions 
and organizations. In this way, the dual processes of the emergence of new rules and 
organizations and the survival and transformation of the old institutions provided China 
with institutional stability. 
The institutional void prevailing in Russia, and the institutional stability prevalent in 
China are likely to influence the structure and relations of social capital of entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists in the two countries. 
The second important factor that affects network structures and relations is culture 
defined as the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of 
one category of people from those of another (Hofstede, 1984).  
Embedded in the Confucian philosophy, the national psyche of the Chinese sharply 
differs from the Russians’ mindset. The postulates such as the universe and man’s life are 
real, all forms of change are expressions of two forces, the yin and the yang, changes take 
place in the form of cycles or spirals rather than extremes are fundamental metaphysics of 
the Chinese thinking. The most Chinese are inclined to think concretely rather than 
abstractly, emphasize the particular rather than the universal, and concerned with 
reconciliation, harmony and balance (Redding, 1990). Understanding is based on 
appreciation and liking rather than analysis and calculations (Mei, 1967).   4 
The Russians in contrast are keen abstract thinkers and transcendental considerations 
have great place in their psyche. The Russians have a tendency to alternate between 
extreme positions, and may occupy two or more mutually exclusive mental positions 
simultaneously. The Russians can be broad yet narrow, reckless yet cautious, tolerant yet 
censorious, and in this way, they will be found in all directions at some time or other 
(Hingley, 1977). 
It is argued that the different mindsets and worldviews of the Chinese and Russians 
are likely to shape the structural and relational patterns of their social networks. 
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, I propose the comparative 
hypotheses on the network structure and relational aspects of the Chinese and Russian 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. In the methods section, I describe the samples, the 
data collection and validation, and the measurements. In the results and discussion 
sections, I present the findings, and discuss them in the comparative perspective. In the 
conclusion, I highlight the contributions, the limitations, and the implications of this 
study. 
HYPOTHESES 
Network Structure  
The indigenous social phenomenon called guanxi (connections) is the Chinese version of 
social networks. Although there is some debate about many nuances of guanxi, there is an 
agreement among scholars on its main meaning: guanxi is interpersonal relationships that 
facilitate social exchange. Guanxi has been interpreted as family relationships, utilitarian 
ties, and particularistic ties embedded in Confucian values (Tsui, Farh, and Xin, 2000; 
Yang, 1994). Researchers found that guanxi relationships promote interpersonal trust, 
facilitate job mobility, and enhance firm performance (Bian, 1997; Farh, Tsui, Xin, & 
Cheng, 1998; Park & Luo, 2001). 
The Russian version of social capital is svyazi (connections) (Efremova, 2000). 
The concept of blat has been used widely to describe informal relationships in the Soviet 
and Russian contexts (Ledeneva, 1998). Although it is accurate to employ the term blat to 
capture the informal exchange practices in the Soviet context, it may be imprecise to 
denote social networks as a generic phenomenon by blat for several reasons. The original 
as well as contemporary meaning of blat is criminal and criminal underground world   5 
(Efremova, 2000). The term therefore has an extreme negative connotation. Most 
Russians prefer a neutral word svyazi to refer to social networks. Previous research 
revealed that svyazi capital reduces uncertainties and risks in financial transactions, 
facilitates access to resources and loans, and enables Russian entrepreneurs to increase 
their sales (Batjargal, 2003; Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001; Sedaitis, 1998). 
It is proposed that network structures, i.e., size, density, structural holes, and 
composition, of the Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs differ due to the cultural and 
institutional differences between two countries. The networks of the Chinese 
entrepreneurs are smaller than that of the Russian entrepreneurs for several reasons. The 
Chinese have inherent inclinations to prefer fewer yet trusted particularistic ties (Farh et 
al, 1998). The Chinese networks are composed of more family members, schoolmates, 
and close friends due to the prevalent role of guanxi base – the propensity to form 
relationships based on common background, i.e., ancestral origin and classmate. Thus, 
guanxi base imposes clear boundaries on network membership, and limits the pool of 
potential members to those who meet criteria for being a member of a particular guanxi 
cluster (Tsui et al, 2000). The Chinese are strongly inclined to categorize people as 
belonging to in and out groups, and members of in-groups only are regarded as members 
of personal guanxi. The gradual institutionalization process  in China enabled social 
actors, including entrepreneurs, to preserve their networks intact over time, and this 
reduces membership turnover in the Chinese networks (Dai, 2002). Further, the 
household registration system in China– hukou that constrains flows of people, restricts 
networking opportunities for the Chinese entrepreneurs. 
  The Chinese networks are denser and more homogeneous. Ethnographic evidence 
on networks of urban residents and entrepreneurs are consistent with this claim (Dai, 
2002; Yang, 1994). Guanxi networks are more transitive - tendency that one’s friends’ 
friends are likely to become one’s friends as well (Granovetter, 1973). Members of a 
particular guanxi cluster are expected to fulfill their role obligations and demonstrate 
group solidarity (Farh et al, 1998; Lin 2001). Knowledge and mindset homogeneity in 
guanxi networks is greater because many network members are classmates who studied 
the same subjects (Farh et al, 1998). In addition, homophily as a social selection   6 
mechanism favors those who are similar in their worldviews since the social and 
geographic distances restrict contact search and tie formation (McPherson et al, 2001).  
  The Chinese make greater efforts to reduce uncertainties and inconsistencies in 
their immediate social worlds, and therefore, the networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs 
are likely to have fewer structural holes defined as the absence of a link between two 
contacts (Burt, 1992). Brokerage between two contacts are perceived as exploitative in 
China, and therefore, the Chinese entrepreneurs will not take deliberate actions to keep 
contacts apart. This is reflected in fewer structural holes. Guanxi networks contain greater 
numbers of internal ties, e.g., family members or colleagues. The Chinese have greater 
willingness to control and monitor personal relationships, and consequently, they prefer 
geographically and socially proximate contacts. Because of the cohesive character of 
Chinese  guanxi, family members and close friends are likely to work in the same 
organization. These factors make the Chinese networks smaller, more integrated and 
homogeneous. 
In contrast, the personal networks of the Russian entrepreneurs are larger in terms 
of size, because the Russians are less particularistic than the Chinese. In the Russian 
networks, social distances between members of in and out groups are not clear-cut, and 
therefore, the Russian entrepreneurs are likely to report greater numbers of ties than the 
Chinese. The Russian economic reforms resulted in the violent destruction of the existing 
institutions and networks. This forced the Russian entrepreneurs to create new networks 
and clusters that increased the absolute size of personal networks over time (Sedaitis, 
1998). Arguably, Russian society is more mobile both horizontally and vertically because 
of the more liberalized labor market and the elimination of the household registration 
system – propiska. This has created greater opportunities for network expansion. 
Russian  svyazi networks are less dense, contain greater numbers of structural 
holes, and are composed of more heterogeneous members (Sedaitis, 1998). Relational 
base, e.g., same hometown and surname, as a networking rule is not as prevalent as it is 
in China and therefore, contact recruitment is less path-dependent in comparison to 
China, although the environmental factors such as corruption and distrust force the 
Russians to be vigilant in dealing with strangers. The internal hierarchy in the Russian 
networks is based on power and status, and this generates greater relational distance   7 
among contacts (Kharkhordin & Gerber 1994). Social sanctions used to punish deviant 
behavior are less severe and effective in Russia, and therefore, the Russians have greater 
autonomies in their networking behavior (Ledeneva 1998). The Russian networks are less 
transitive because there is less trust embedded in relationships (Petrovskii 1991). 
Brokerage is more accepted, and therefore, the Russians are likely to keep contacts 
disconnected to maximize gains from their intermediate positions. There is no dominant 
networking principle that structures personal networks, and therefore, the svyazi networks 
are composed of members who differ in their ascribed and achieved attributes (Ledeneva, 
1994). Because of the less in-group cognitive pressure to internalize and accept views of 
other contacts, the mindsets of Russian members are less homogenized over time. Based 
on these discussions, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (a): Network size of the Chinese entrepreneurs is smaller than that of the 
Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (b): Network density of the Chinese entrepreneurs is greater than that of the 
Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (c): Networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs have fewer structural holes than 
that of the Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (d): Networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs are more homogeneous in terms 
of education than that of the Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (e): Networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs have more internal ties than that 
of the Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Relational aspect 
The Chinese guanxi networks and Russian svyazi networks differ in terms of tie age, tie 
strength, perceived homogeneity, and interpersonal trust. Dyadic (two person) 
relationships in China on average are older than in Russia because most contacts are   8 
either family members, or schoolmates who know each other for many years. The 
Chinese networks are more stable over time both in terms of changes in structural 
properties and membership turnover compared to the Russian networks due to the gradual 
evolution of institutions and organizations. The Chinese are more conservative socially, 
have greater relational inertia defined as a tendency to stick to the same social ties over 
time, and are motivated to preserve existing relationships as long as ties generate 
acceptable net returns. The Chinese notion of renching (reciprocity) - a well-articulated 
set of expectations, exchange norms, and informal re-enforcing devices – facilitates 
relational longevity.  For example, CEO of a software firm based in Beijing said in an 
interview: 
Author: This sounds like you sacrificed your firm’s interests. 
CEO: No. There is this Chinese tradition called renching. … You can screw up one or 
two persons but you can’t screw up all. That is really bad in the long term. The Chinese 
take renching seriously (Author's interview, September 2001, Beijing). 
 
  Various social symbols and rituals make Chinese guanxi networks more coherent 
and enduring over time. Gaining, giving, saving and losing face are recognized symbolic 
interactions in Confucian cultures. Highly ritualistic interactions such as gift giving, 
social dining and tea sessions are prevalent routines in guanxi relationships (Yang, 1996). 
There are many indirect signals and “silent messages” in guanxi practice and 
communications that promote mutual understanding, respect and emotional bond between 
sides. 
  Skillful consensus-making and willingness to accommodate each other’s opinions 
promotes greater perceived intellectual similarity in the Chinese guanxi. The strong in-
group pressure and intense guanxi communication homogenizes mindsets of members of 
a particular guanxi clique over time (Lin, 2001). These factors generate greater perceived 
homogeneity in China. 
  Chinese dyadic ties require frequent interactions and intense efforts to maintain 
relationships. Dyads in the Chinese context can be multiplex, i.e., a single relationship 
fulfils various functions including access to information and resources, emotional 
support, and political protection. Chinese dyads are more costly to establish and maintain   9 
in terms of time, resources and commitment. As a result, the two sides in Chinese 
relationships are more motivated to mobilize resources for each other making dyads 
stronger than in Russia. 
Chinese and Russian triads (three-person) differ in terms of mutual expectations, 
social control mechanisms, and symbolic aspects of interactions. The central actor in the 
Chinese triangle is more powerful, and has many leverages to influence behaviors of triad 
members than the central player in the Russian triads. Social sanctions are more effective 
in the Chinese triads because face serves as a social currency that has a definite value. In 
addition, the Chinese are likely to have higher expectations and show more conformist 
behaviors in triple relationships for cultural reasons. 
The institutional stability prevalent in China provides favorable conditions for 
relative trustworthy behavior of actors (Hitt et all, 2004). The Chinese are trustful of their 
family members and close friends but distrustful of those whom they do not know 
(Redding, 1990). The Chinese generally trust those who have been recommended to them 
by a trustworthy source- a family member or close friend - because information diffusion 
and re-enforcing mechanisms are more effective in guanxi clusters than in the Russian 
networks (Lin, 2001). For example, the following conversation with CEO of a Chinese 
Internet platform provider supports this assertion (Author’s interview, April 2002, 
Beijing): 
CEO: I met Wang at a private party hosted by a friend. My friend and Wang were 
classmates in the School of the Communist Party of China… It was a risky decision to 
sign such a large contract with him because his firm does not specialize in a type of 
digital image equipment, which we were looking for. I also was worried that they can’t 
customize their products to our clients – Chinese firms. 
 
Author: Why did you sign the contract? 
CEO: Well, it is complicated… It was cheaper although there were issues on the quality 
side. And the guy appeared honest and trustworthy. I verified that with my friend who 
knows him well… 
   10  
In this way, interpersonal trust is more “transferable” in China. In addition, the 
Chinese are more skillful in establishing well-defined exchange rules and punishing those 
who violate exchange norms. 
By contrast, dyadic ties in Russia on average are younger, and they do not usually 
require frequent tie re-activation, once some kind of relationship has been established. 
Russian ties are less personalized, and there are personal and business segments within 
network clusters. In addition, the Russians tend to keep greater distances in interpersonal 
relationships than the Chinese. For example, the word blat might be used to refer to 
instrumental ties whereas terms such as "ours" are used to separate a close circle of 
friends from job related contacts. There are no such social concepts as face or renching to 
regulate the social behavior of individuals and groups. 
The Russian concept of reciprocity is simpler, less universal and often ignored in 
relationships. Therefore, the Russians have to rely more on “mechanical” monitoring 
techniques, and this leads to higher cost in terms of re-enforcement of social obligations. 
The following assertion of the managing director of a large trading firm in Ekaterinburg 
confirms this conclusion: 
Director: Of course, we try to develop trusted relationships with our clients and suppliers. 
However, we have an idiom in Russia that "trust but monitor" (Author's interview, April 
1999, Ekaterinburg). 
 
The Russians do trust their family members but clan-type relationships do not 
exist in Russia. Unlike the Chinese, the Russians are less trustful of third parties even if a 
trusted intermediary has recommended that person. A successful Russian banker said in 
an interview (Author’s interview, May 1999, Moscow): 
Banker: … Now days it is difficult to trust people when everybody tries to out maneuver 
or screw up others… 
 
Author: Even your friends? 
 
Banker: Sometimes. 
   11  
Author: How about friends of friends? 
 
Banker: Oh, worse… I prefer to do business with those whom I know well. 
 
The Russian practice of “I am from Alexandr Alexandrovich” thus applies to 
instrumental actions rather than intimate trust cultivation. The Russians prefer to establish 
direct personal relationships since triad ties are perceived risky in the chaotic and crisis-
driven environment. Direct communications are more effective for trust-building in 
Russia. The Russians are less ritualistic but there are important symbolic routines such as 
gift giving, and vodka sessions. In contrast to the harmony-loving Chinese, the Russians 
are more expressive in relationships, and do not mind conflicts and fights, and therefore, 
there is a greater perception of opinion diversity in the Russian svyazi networks. Building 
on these assumptions, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (a): The average tie age in China is greater than in Russia. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (b): Networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs are more homogeneous in terms 
of perception than that of the Russian entrepreneurs. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (c): Referee-venture capitalist relationship in China is stronger than in 
Russia.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (d): Referee-entrepreneur relationship is stronger in China than in Russia. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (e): Inter-personal trust is greater in China than in Russia. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data of Software Entrepreneurs 
The data are composed of structured telephone interviews with 159 software 
entrepreneurs in Beijing and Moscow. Some 82 Russian entrepreneurs were interviewed 
in June-August 2003, and 77 Chinese entrepreneurs were interviewed in September-  12  
October 2003. In total, 118 respondents were CEOs, and 41 respondents were chief 
technology officers (CTO). The technical directors were interviewed only in those 
occasions when the CEO was unavailable and the firm has more than 50 full-time 
employees. 
  Using different information sources such as telephone directories and electronic 
data bases of high tech firms, my research assistants and I created a list of 111 new, 
dedicated and domestic software ventures based in Moscow. The positive response rate 
for the Russian sample is 74 percent. In Beijing, we created a list of 172 ventures. The 
positive response rate for the Chinese sample is 45 percent. I conducted the ANOVA 
tests on firm age and Zhongguancun location (the high tech district in Western Beijing) 
between the two samples, and found that younger firms were more likely to decline. 
  The questionnaire was designed in English. Teams of Chinese and Russian 
management professors translated the instrument into Chinese and Russian. The back 
translation and checking was performed by different Chinese and Russian management 
professors who earned doctorates from North American universities. Two research 
assistants and I conducted interviews in Moscow, and the team of six research assistants 
carried out interviews in Beijing. Each interview lasted approximately in 20-30 minutes. 
Sample and Data of Venture Capitalists 
In Moscow, we identified 23 domestic private equity firms. These firms invest in new as 
well as older firms in the form of management buy-out and buy-in. Therefore, they may 
be regarded as private equity firms and venture capital firms simultaneously. I conducted 
structured telephone interviews with CEOs and lead fund managers of 15 venture capital 
(VC) firms in July-August 2004. Six CEOs declined our request, and two were not 
reachable. In Beijing, we created a list of 117 domestic private equity firms. Like in 
Russia, these firms invest both in young and established firms. We interviewed 22 CEOs 
and lead fund managers in September-October 2004. Thirty-six CEOs refused to 
cooperate, and 58 were not reachable. In all, we interviewed 37 CEOs and lead fund 
managers in the two cities. 
  We asked each fund manager to select the last two positive investment decisions 
(firm decided to invest) based upon recommendation of third-parties (referees), and the 
last two negative investment decisions (firm decided not to investment) despite   13  
recommendations of third-parties. Thus, we collected information on a maximum of four 
investment decisions from each respondent. In this way, investments were selected 
randomly within two groups. In total, we collected information on 122 investment 
decisions: 61 positive and 61 negative. 
Measures 
Independent variable. The predictor variable is China, and the reference group is Russia. 
Dependent variables. Data on network structure were collected by the standard method 
of name generators and name interpreters (Burt, 1992; Marsden, 1990). The questionnaire 
contained one name generator and three name interpreters. The name generator is: “The 
next questions are about those with whom you often discuss issues related to software 
programming and design. Please name those persons with whom you have discussed 
software programming issues over the last six months”. This question generated 
maximum 8 names. The network content is the discussion network about software 
programming and design. Three name interpreters were relational duration (tie age) 
between ego and alters measured in years (how long do you know the contact), alter 
education (BA degree in engineering, science and arts/humanities), and whether alter is a 
full-time employee of the firm (yes and no). Ego is a focal actor who is connected to a set 
of people who are defined as alters. The question that captured network density and 
structural holes is as follows: “The next question is to describe the strength of relations 
between listed people. You do this by circling codes in the matrix below. This is a 
complex question, but it is essential to measuring of social networks – and answering the 
question is a simple task when taken one column at a time. Begin with the first person 
listed. Relations with the first person are listed in the third column. Indicate his or her 
relationship with the person in each row in one of three ways: Circle E if there is an 
especially close relation between the row person and the first person. Circle D if the row 
person and first person are distant in the sense that they are rarely work together, are total 
strangers as far as you know, or do not enjoy one another’s company. Leave E D blank to 
indicate that two people are neither distant nor especially close” (Burt 1992). 
  Network size is the number of contacts named. Network density is measured as the 
percentage of “especially close” relationships within the total number of possible 
relationships among alters (Marsden, 1990). Structural holes is measured as the number   14  
of “distant” relationships among alters (Burt 1992). Tie age is the sum of years ego 
knows all alters divided by the number of alters. Internal ties captures the percentage of 
alters who are full-time employees of the firm. Education homophily is measured as the 
inverse of the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) (Agresti & Agresti, 1978). Since I 
measure the extent to which alters are similar in their education content, I used this 
measurement. This is consistent with the previous research on network structure of 
Russian entrepreneurs (Sedaitis, 1998). The IQV indicates the dispersion of the alters 
over three nominal categories of education, i.e., engineering, science and arts/humanities 
(Sedaitis, 1998). For example, if education heterophily is .45, education homophily is .55. 
This variable indicates the extent to which alters are similar in their education content. 
Perceived homophily (Cronbach alpha is 0.82) is the scale comprised of two questions: 
“My way of thinking about software programming and design is similar to ways of 
thinking of those with whom I discuss ideas about software development”; “I always 
come up with similar ideas about software programming with those with whom I discuss 
ideas about software development”. Distribution values of each question were five-point 
Likert scale items ranging from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). I computed 
the scale by adding up the values in each item and dividing them by two. 
Referee-venture capitalist tie was measured by two items: “How close are you with 
the third-party (referee)”; “On average, how often do you talk to each third-party 
(referee)” (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81). These measurements are standard measurements 
for tie strength (Marsden, 1990). Respondents responded to 4-point Likert scale items. 
First item was measured as especially close (4), close (3), less than close (2), and distant 
(1). Second item was measured as daily (4), weekly (3), monthly (2), and less often (1). 
The mean of two items was used as the scale score. 
Referee-entrepreneur tie was measured as the mean of the following three questions: 
“I know that the third-party had a professional relationship with the entrepreneur prior the 
recommendation”; “I know that the third-party was engaged in informal social activities, 
e.g., dinners and other social activities, with the entrepreneur prior the recommendation”; 
“I know that the third-party and entrepreneur were personal friends prior the 
recommendation” (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73). This variable and other independent 
variables were measured by 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to   15  
strongly agree (5). I adapted these items from Shane and Cable (2002), although I had to 
reformulate them for investors rather than entrepreneurs. 
Control variables. Firm age (Software and VC) is the number of years a firm had been in 
existence.  Firm size (Software and VC) is measured by the number of full-time 
employees at the time of survey. Venture capital (Software) is a binary variable of one if 
private equity was raised and zero otherwise. Ownership (Software) is a binary variable 
of one if the major shareholder is the respondent and zero otherwise. IT industry (VC) is a 
binary variable of one if the equity receiver firm is in IT and zero otherwise. State 
ownership (VC) is a binary variable of one if state is a shareholder and zero otherwise. 
Data and construct validity. Measurements for network size, density, structural holes, tie 
age, and internal ties are externally valid because the name generator method has been 
proved as valid and reliable (Burt 1992; Marsden, 1990). 
  I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement model associated 
with Likert scale items to assess how well the interview questions load onto the 
constructs. I found that the comparative fit index is 0.79, the incremental fit index is 0.84, 
and the root mean squared error of approximation is 0.071. The findings suggest that the 
measurement is valid and reliable. 
  In order to check common methods bias, we carried out data cross-validation 
phone calls. During the interviews with software entrepreneurs, we asked for phone 
numbers of one of the contacts listed. In all, 41 Chinese respondents and 28 Russian 
respondents provided phone numbers. By selecting every second on the list of 41 Chinese 
contacts, and every second and third on the list of 28 Russian contacts, we contacted 20 
Chinese and 20 Russian alters and asked several questions. We asked whether the 
contact’s BA education was in engineering, science, and arts/humanities. The answers of 
19 (95%) Chinese alters and the answers of 18 (90%) Russian contacts were consistent 
with our data collected from the respondents. Therefore, education homophily 
measurement is valid. We asked each contact to describe her/his relationship with the 
person next on the list in terms of “especially close”, “distant” and “neither especially 
close nor distant”. All 20 (100%) Chinese answers and 17 (85%) Russian answers 
matched up our findings. This indicates that the measurements for network density and 
structural holes are valid. To my knowledge, this study is the only study that validated   16  
perceptions of the ego of relationships among alters by asking one alter to characterize 
her relationship with another alter. To cross-validate the perceptual homophily items, we 
asked two questions: “My way of thinking about software programming and design is 
similar to the way of thinking of (Ego)”; “We (Ego and I) always come up with similar 
ideas about software programming”. The answers of 17 (85%) Chinese contacts and the 
answers of 15 (75%) Russian alters were consistent with our findings. The homophily 
items are valid. 
Measurements for referee-venture capitalist tie are externally valid, because these 
items have been proved as valid and reliable in previous research (Marsden, 1990).   
Measurements for referee-entrepreneur tie are externally valid, because previous research 
has shown that these items are valid and reliable (Shane and Cable 2002). 
Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) for these measurements were above 
0.73. I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement model associated 
with Likert-scale items to assess how well our interview questions load onto the 
constructs. I found that the comparative fit index is 0.81, the incremental fit index is 0.89, 
and the root mean-squared error of approximation is 0.079. In addition, I carried out a 
factor analysis that focused only on independent variables: Fit indexes were above 0.81 
and the factor loading was acceptable (the average on-factor loading was 0.61). The 
findings suggest that our data are valid internally. Shane & Cable (2002) did the same 
analysis for same-question items and found even better results. 
In order to check for social desirability bias, we conducted data cross-validation 
telephone calls. During the interviews with venture capitalists, we asked for phone 
numbers of one referee (third party) and one entrepreneur. In all, we obtained phone 
numbers of twelve Chinese referees, eight Russian referees, nine Chinese entrepreneurs, 
and five Russian entrepreneurs. We made phone calls to both referees and entrepreneurs. 
In the case of referees, we asked several questions to verify perceptions of the 
venture capitalist. We asked the question: “How close are you with the venture 
capitalist”. The answers of twelve Chinese referees and six Russian referees were 
consistent with our findings. We proposed the statement “I was engaged in informal 
social activities, e.g., dinners and other social activities, with the entrepreneur prior the 
recommendation”. The answers of nine Chinese referees and eight Russian referees   17  
matched our data. We asked the question: “What extent do you trust venture capitalists?”. 
We found that scales of eleven Chinese referees and seven Russian referees were 
congruent with the data that we collected from venture capitalists. Finally, we asked the 
question: “How strong was your recommendation?”. The answers of ten Chinese third-
parties, and five Russian third-parties were consistent with our data. 
In the case of entrepreneurs, we validated several measurements. We asked the 
question: “I was engaged in informal social activities, e.g., dinners and other social 
activities, with the third-party prior the recommendation”. The answers of eight Chinese 
entrepreneurs, and six Russian entrepreneurs matched up our findings. We proposed the 
following statement: “At least one member of the venture team had previous startup 
experience”. The answers of all Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs were consistent with 
our data. We come up with the following statement: “The technology employed or 
products offered by the venture would provide a significant competitive advantage”. Six 
Chinese entrepreneurs, and three Russian entrepreneurs confirmed our findings. We also 
verified the answers to the following item: “The venture is a potentially high-growth 
firm”. Only four Chinese and three Russian entrepreneurs’ answers were consistent with 
venture capitalists’ assessment of their ventures. As a whole, these findings suggest that 
our data on venture capitalists’ perceptions are valid, reliable, and less biased. To my 
knowledge, this study is the only study that cross-validated perceptions of triad members, 
i.e., venture capitalist, referee, and entrepreneur. Two research assistants who were not 
members of the interview teams conducted validation interviews in Beijing and Moscow. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s correlations for all 
variables of the total sample of the Chinese and Russian software entrepreneurs (N=159). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for the total sample 
of the Chinese and Russian venture capitalists (Number of investment decisions is 124).  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlations (Software Entrepreneurs)  
 
 Variables 
 
N M  S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Network  size  158 4.29 1.34        
2 Tie  age  157 4.92 3.53  .05       
3 Network  density  157 .42 .38 -.18* .14      
4 Structural  holes  157 2.63 3.21  .56** .14 -.42**     
5 Internal  ties  158 .73 .29 -.18* -.02  .40**  -.48**    
6 Education 
homophily 
158 .67 .28 -.14  .07  .13 -.17* .13 
 
7 Perceived 
homophily 
158 3.18 .89  -.09  .09 .31**  -.25**  .32** .14 
8 Firm  age 
(Software) 
159 3.33 1.44  .12 .25** -.13 .29** -.10  .15 
9 Firm  size 
(Software) 
159  47.67  52.37  .15* -.06 -.15* .07  .04 .17* 
10 Ownership  159 .59 .49 -.08  .22** .15  .06 -.17* -.15 
11 Venture  capital  159 .13 .33 -.02 -.05 -.14 -.03 .01 -.06 
12 China  159  .48  .50 -.26**  -.26** .20* -.40**  .26** .24** 
              
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Software Entrepreneurs) 
(Continued) 
 Variables 
 
7 8 9  10  11 
8 Firm  age 
(Software) 
-.15       
9 Firm  size 
(Software) 
-.17*  .31**     
10 Ownership  .15  -.09  -.28**     
11 Venture 
capital 
.06  .00 .17* -.09   
12  China  -.24**  -.29** .14  -.18* .18* 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Venture Capitalists) 
 
  Variables  N  M  SD  1 2 3 4 
1 Referee-venture 
capitalist tie 
121  2.42  .66      
2 Referee-entrepreneur 
tie 
121 2.89  .73 .29**      
3 Interpersonal  trust  121 2.99  .95 .38** .1     
4  Firm age (VC)  124  4  2.47  .26** .15  -.09   
5  Firm size (VC)  124  20  13.5  .05  .02  .13  .52** 
6  IT  industry  124 .48  .5  .21* .03 .21* -.16 
7 State  ownership  124  .14  .35  -.04  .03  .2* .36** 
8 China 
 
124 .51  50 .33** -.07  .28** -
.38** 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson's Correlations (Venture Capitalists) 
(Con’t) 
  Variables 5  6  7 
6 IT  Industry  -.08     
7 State  ownership  -.09  .05   
8 China 
 
-.07 .25** .03 
 
 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, and the ANOVA results for the 
Chinese and Russian software entrepreneurs. It shows that two samples significantly 
differ in all variables except perceived homophily. The Chinese networks are smaller, 
denser, contain fewer structural holes, and composed of more internal ties and 
homogeneous alters. The Chinese ventures are younger, larger, and more likely to raise 
private equity. Few Chinese entrepreneurs own shares in their firms. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA (Software Entrepreneurs) 
 
   China 
 
Russia ANOVA 
model 
  
 
N Means  S.D. N Means S.D.  F 
1 Network  size 
  76 3.92  1.45  82 4.63 1.13  11.82*** 
2 Tie  age 
  75 3.95  2.57  82 5.80 4.04  11.42*** 
3 Network  density 
  75 .50  .45  82 .34  .29  6.76* 
4 Structural  holes 
  75 1.26  2.61  82 3.87 3.21  30.77*** 
5 Internal  ties 
  76 .81  .30  82 .66  .26  11.34*** 
6 Education  homophily 
  76 .74  .33  82 .60  .21 9.70** 
8 Perceived  homophily 
  76 3.28  1.02  82 3.09  .75  1.80 
9  Firm age (Software) 
  77 2.89  1.32  82 3.74 1.43  15.29*** 
10  Firm size (Software) 
  77  55.48  54.67 82  40.34 49.33  3.36¶ 
11 Ownership 
  77 .50  .50  82 .68  .46  5.24* 
12 Venture  capital 
  77 .19  .39  82 .07  .26  5.22* 
¶p <0.1 *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p< 0.001 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and ANOVA (Venture Capitalists) 
 
   China 
 
Russia ANOVA 
model 
  
 
N Means  S.D. N Means S.D.  F 
1 Referee-venture  capitalist 
tie  61 2.63  .63 60  2.2  .62  14.57*** 
2 Referee-entrepreneur  tie 
  61 2.84  .94 60 2.95  .44  .59 
3 Interpersonal  trust 
  61 3.26  1.11  60 2.71  .66  10.71*** 
4  Firm age (VC) 
  64 3.12  1.06  60  5  3.12  20.52*** 
5  Firm size (VC) 
  64 19 9 60 20  16  .6 
6 IT  industry 
  64 .6  .49  60  .35 .48 8.8** 
7 State  ownership  64  .15  .36  60  .13  .34  .12 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p< 0.001  21 
 
 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and the ANOVA results for the Chinese as 
well as Russian venture capitalists. The two samples significantly differ in several 
variables. Referee-venture capitalist tie is stronger in China. The Chinese fund managers 
have greater trust in referees than the Russians. The private equity firms based in 
Moscow are older than the firms based in Beijing. Most Chinese entrepreneurial firms 
were in the IT industry. 
Social capital of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in China and Russia 
In Table 5, I present the results of the linear regression analysis predicting social capital 
of the Chinese entrepreneurs. Model 1 reveals that networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs 
are smaller. The model is significant (F=4.09). Hypothesis 1 (a) that predicted smaller 
network size for the Chinese has been confirmed. Model 2 suggests that personal 
networks of the Chinese executives are denser. The model is significant (F=4.21). 
Hypothesis 1(b) that proposed more cohesive and integrated networks for the Chinese is 
supported. Model 3 reveals that guanxi networks contain fewer structural holes. The 
model is significant (F=7.82). Hypothesis 1 (c) is confirmed. Model 4 illustrates that 
guanxi networks are more homogeneous in terms of members’ education than Russian 
svyazi networks. The model is significant (F=4.89). Hypothesis 1(d) on homophily is 
supported. Model 5 reveals that the Chinese establish and maintain relationships with 
their colleagues more often than the Russians. The model is significant (F=3). Hypothesis 
1 (e) on internal ties is confirmed.  
 
Table 5. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Networks of the Chinese 
Entrepreneurs (N=159) 
 
 Networ
k size 
Networ
k 
density 
Structura
l holes 
Education 
homophil
y 
Interna
l ties 
Tie age  Perceived 
homophil
y 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 7 
Firm age 
(Software) 
-.04 .01  .16  .22* -.05  .25  .05 
Firm size 
(Software) 
.19* -.13  .09  .06  -.01  -.06  .06 
Ownershi
p 
-.09 .15  .03  -.07 -.14  .2*  .12 
Venture -.01 -.15  .01  -.13 -.05  .01 -.16*  22 
 
 
capital 
China -.32***  .28***  -.36***  .31***  .22**  -.13  .16 
            
Model F  4.09**  4.21***  7.82***  4.89***  3*  5.45**
* 
1.8 
Adjusted 
R square 
.09  .09 .18  .11 .06  .12 .02 
 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p< 0.001 
 
  Model 6 shows that dyadic tie age in China is not greater than in Russia. The 
model is significant (F=5.45). Hypothesis 2 (a) is not supported. Model 7 reveals that 
guanxi networks are not more homogeneous in terms of perception than Russian svyazi 
networks. The model is not significant. Hypothesis 2 (b) on perceived homophily is not 
confirmatory. 
 
Table 6. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Networks of the Chinese Venture 
Capitalists (N=124) 
 
 Referee-
venture 
capitalist tie 
Referee-
entrepreneur 
tie 
Interpersonal 
trust 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Firm age (VC)  -.2  .25  -.37* 
Firm size (VC)  .45***  -.11  .38* 
IT industry  .14  .07  .12 
State ownership  .06  -.07  .37 
China .23*  .01  .12** 
      
Model F  8.17***  .85  6.78*** 
Adjusted R square  .23  .01  .19 
 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p< 0.001 
 
Model 1 in Table 6 proves that referee-venture capitalist tie is stronger in China. The 
model is significant (F=8.17). Hypothesis 2 (c) holds up. Model 2 demonstrates that 
referee-entrepreneur tie is not stronger in China. The model is not significant. Hypothesis 
2 (d) is not supported. Finally, model 3 reveals that interpersonal trust is greater in China 
than in Russia. The model is significant (F=6.78). Hypothesis 2 (e) has been confirmed. 
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DISCUSSION 
The findings suggest that networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs are smaller, denser, and 
more homogeneous compared to networks of the Russian entrepreneurs. The gradual 
institutionalization in China has conflicting effects on the network dynamics of the 
Chinese entrepreneurs. On the one hand, it promotes stability and reduces social 
uncertainties, which are reflected in smaller, more integrated, and homogeneous guanxi 
networks. On the other hand, it prevents the Chinese entrepreneurs to restructure their 
networks, and hinders network expansion, membership renewal and resource enrichment. 
The speedy deinstitutionalization occurred in Russia, on the contrary, disrupted the 
existing networks and forced the Russian entrepreneurs to establish new networks and 
clusters that are larger in size, less cohesive and dense, and more heterogeneous than 
networks of the Chinese executives. 
  Further, the Chinese entrepreneurs prefer smaller, coherent, and controllable 
personal networks due to the main cultural features of the Chinese such as more 
collectivistic and uncertainty avoiding than the Russians. The Chinese managers actively 
promote mutual dependence and interconnectedness in order to eliminate any gaps or 
holes in their networks. Transitivity is greater in the Chinese networks, and therefore, 
guanxi cliques have clearly defined boundaries for members and non-members. In this 
sense, members of a particular guanxi cluster have strong identities and high expectations 
as a part of a clan. The networks of the Chinese executives are more homogeneous in 
terms of knowledge, ideas, and worldviews. This feature promotes intellectual and social 
harmony among the network members. The high density and homogeneity makes guanxi 
networks less inclusive, and therefore, those who are perceived as outsiders and those 
who have different views and opinions are likely to be excluded from important guanxi 
deals. Being populated by more internal ties, networks of the Chinese entrepreneurs 
operate and function rather like a closed clan. This network closure offers certain 
advantages as well as disadvantages for its members (Coleman, 1988). For example, 
Batjargal (2004) found that dense and homogeneous networks of entrepreneurs have 
positive effects on product development and revenue growth of new firms at early stages 
because of trust, cooperation and solidarity benefits. However, tight and uniformed  24 
 
 
networks may turn into liabilities by blocking information and resource flows at later 
stages of venture development.  
In contrast, the Russian networks are composed of more weak ties, and members 
who differ in their mindsets and knowledge patterns. In this sense, the Russian svyazi 
networks are more open and absorptive than the Chinese guanxi networks. The Russians 
seem to benefit from the networks rich in structural holes that expose them to diverse 
information, knowledge, and resources (Burt, 1992). The downsides of such networks are 
greater membership turnover, unstable relationships, and high monitoring cost. 
  Interpersonal ties are stronger and interpersonal trust is greater in China. The 
gradual institutional changes enabled the Chinese entrepreneurs to keep their 
relationships with actors in the old organizations, e.g., the communist party, in tact for 
years, and this is reflected in greater tie strength and trust. The cadres from the existing 
organizations were transferred to the new institutions and organizations on a very large 
scale, and therefore, dyadic ties were not disrupted. The institutional continuity generated 
a sense of certainty and confidence among the Chinese entrepreneurs that facilitated 
cooperative and trustworthy behavior of actors. In the stable environment, contacts 
provide useful information, connections and tangible resources on a regular basis, and 
this reduces entrepreneurs’ motivations to restructure their networks. 
  The core elements in the Chinese thinking – the doctrine of the middle that avoids 
extremes, and the balance between the yin and the yang  - encourage the Chinese not to 
take dramatic actions regarding established relationships. This results in greater 
interpersonal affection and mutual trust. The Confucian emphasis on social harmony 
facilitates trust building among members of a guanxi cluster over time. The group 
mindsets and a stronger sense of belonging of the Chinese lead to frequent and 
substantive communications. This leads to greater trust and lasting relationships. A 
Chinese person defines her/his identity through relationships with her/his family, friends, 
and acquaintances that are trusted and respected. Further, there are numerous guanxi 
methods and techniques that the entrepreneurs use effectively to nurture strong and 
trusted  guanxi ties. Thus, frequent interactions, multi-content relationships, informal 
norms, and mutual expectations make guanxi ties stronger and trustworthy than Russian  25 
 
 
svyazi relationships. Particularistic ties in Russia are weaker, informal norms are less 
effective, and there is less trust embedded in Russian dyads. 
CONCLUSION 
The gradual institutionalization in China, and the rapid deinstitutionalization in Russia 
influences social capital of the Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
through changes in the formal rules, regulations, and organizations. The contrasting 
cultures of the Chinese and the Russians affect structural and relational patterns of social 
networks, because the mindsets and worldviews of the two peoples differ. 
The evolutionary transformation in China, i.e., the parallel process of the 
emergence of the new rules, and survival of the old organizations, and the core cultural 
values of the Chinese provide greater stability, continuity, and harmony that are reflected 
in smaller, more cohesive, and homogeneous networks, and stronger and trusted dyadic 
relationships. The revolutionary nature of the Russian reforms, i.e., the simultaneous 
process of the violent elimination of the old institutions and the inhibited emergence of 
the new rules and regulations, and the core cultural characteristics of the Russians 
generated the institutional and cultural environments that are conducive to larger, less 
integrated, and heterogeneous networks, and weaker and less trusted ties.  
  I claim a number of contributions of this study to the management research 
literature. First, the finding that local institutions and cultures influence social capital in 
the interactive ways is a relatively new finding both in institutional theory and cultural 
theory. Second, I introduced the new concept “comparative social capital” in this article, 
and make a contribution to social network theory by presenting the comparative analysis 
of Chinese guanxi networks and Russian svyazi networks. Third, this study is one of first 
systematic and comparative studies that examined networks of entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists as dependent variables, and therefore, the paper is a contribution to the 
growing literature on entrepreneurial networks. Finally, the main independent variable of 
the analysis is China, and therefore, this paper enriches the management literature on the 
Asia Pacific region. 
  This article has several limitations that should be discussed. I did not test directly 
effects of institutions and cultures on social capital, but I used the country dummy - 
China as the proxy for institutional and cultural differences. I acknowledge that this is a  26 
 
 
rough measurement. This study examines social capital of software entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists. Therefore, there is an issue of generalizability of the findings to the 
whole population of entrepreneurs in China and Russia. Samples are relatively small, and 
sampling of venture capitalists is neither complete nor random. There is an issue of the 
potential nonindependence of observations. I used social network measurements that 
were developed in the Western contexts for measuring indigenous phenomena deeply 
rooted in the Chinese and Russian cultures – guanxi and svyazi. In this way, I may have 
overlooked unique features of Chinese guanxi and Russian svyazi. The software and 
venture capital industries in China and Russia are young. These conditions may have 
affected the results, although I assume that all the respondents have been exposed to the 
same conditions to the same extent. The surveys of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
were carried out at certain time points and only once. Therefore, the results may be 
subject to temporal factors or embeddedness. I acknowledge that all these constitute the 
shortcomings of this study. 
I suggest several implications for further research. The concept “comparative 
social capital” should be defined precisely and be operationalized so that valid 
measurements can be developed and used. Comparative analysis of guanxi and svyazi 
networks may be conducted at inter-organizational level. For example, one could 
examine how inter-firm alliances differ in the two countries, and what are the 
implications of these differences for firm performance. An interesting and important topic 
for further research is comparative analysis of social capital in different country contexts. 
For example, how Chinese guanxi differs from Japanese kankei or Korean inmak, and 
what implications it has for entrepreneurial performance.  
The practical implication is that managers, entrepreneurs, and investors are 
advised to craft networking strategies and tactics that fit in the institutional and cultural 
environments of a given country. 
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